Annual Report TIB 2024

Toetsingscommissie Inzet Bevoegdheden

Preface

In my first full year as chairperson of the Investigatory Powers Commission (TIB), I have been proud to see how hard and meticulously the staff and members of the commission have worked throughout the year.

This year, we processed a record number of 4,445 rulings, which is more than 30% higher than in 2023, when there was already a significant increase. We have not experienced any delays and I can report from my own knowledge that the work has been carried out with the same level of care.

Current developments around the world are also reflected in the full range of issues that are brought before us. The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) are responsible for protecting our national security and investigating individuals and organisations. They do this in many different ways. Sometimes this goes too far and infringes on fundamental rights. Examples include intercepting mobile telephone communications, hacking computers or intercepting cable data traffic, but also installing cameras and microphones in private spaces or searching homes.

As an independent body, we assess the lawfulness of the authorisation granted by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence for the use of the most far-reaching investigatory powers against citizens and organisations by the AIVD and the MIVD. In more than 96% of cases, that authorisation was lawfully granted by the Minister. In the other cases, authorisation was not granted lawfully and the powers cannot and may not be exercised. We maintain open and professional contact with the Ministers and both services on this matter.

We have increasingly frequent, intensive and pleasant consultations with the Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) on coordination in the broad field of activities of both organisations.

> “In 2024, the TIB issued 4,445 rulings on the use of special investigatory powers.”

In the long term, after the revision of the Intelligence and Security Services Act, we envisage continuing together as a single end-to-end oversight body. Our working title for this body is the National Security Authority (Autoriteit Nationale Veiligheid).

As the TIB, we are very aware of the importance of striking a balance between the protection and infringement of fundamental rights. In this way, we contribute to democracy under the rule of law, both now and in the future. We look forward to 2025!

Anne Mieke Zwaneveld,
Chairperson of the TIB

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1. The TIB and figures

The TIB is an independent commission that reviews the use of several special investigatory powers exercised by the AIVD and the MIVD (hereinafter also referred to as “the services”). The TIB monitors the balance between the protection and infringement of fundamental rights.

In case of a serious suspicion that there is a threat to the democratic legal order, or to the security or other vital interests of the state (hereinafter referred to as “national security”), it may be necessary to use far-reaching special investigatory powers to prevent a threat or to identify such a threat in good time. Such use may result in a violation of fundamental rights such as the privacy of individuals or large groups of citizens, even though it is necessary for the protection of national security. Therefore, each time a special investigatory power is used, it must be carefully considered whether it is lawful to actually exercise that power. The authorisation granted by the Minister is therefore reviewed by the TIB before that power is actually exercised. The TIB’s ruling is binding. The TIB’s prior review thus ensures a balance between protection and infringement of citizens’ fundamental rights.

Process of requesting authorisation for the use of special investigatory powers.

1. If the AIVD or the MIVD wishes to exercise a special investigatory power, the Minister decides whether or not to grant authorisation.

Searching homes | Intercepting telephone communications | Hacking computers/ investigating internet cable | Satellite interception | Conducting a DNA investigation

2. If the Minister grants such authorisation, the request is forwarded to the TIB.
3. The TIB assesses this authorisation on the basis of five principles:
   - It must be necessary to exercise the power (necessity).
   - The exercise of the power must not cause disproportionate harm in relation to the purpose of the power (proportionality).
   - When choosing the power, the services must use the least restrictive power that can achieve the desired purpose (subsidiarity).
   - The use of the power must be as targeted as possible (specificity).
   - The request must meet all formal requirements set out in the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (ISS Act 2017).
4. If the TIB rules that the authorisation was lawfully granted by the Minister, the AIVD or the MIVD may exercise the power. If the TIB rules that the authorisation was not lawfully granted by the Minister, the power may not be exercised.

Authorisation to use a special investigatory power is usually granted for a period of three months. If, after the authorisation period, the use of that power is still considered necessary, proportionate and subsidiary, the service may submit an extension request. That authorisation will again be reviewed by the TIB prior to the extension. An extension is generally also granted for a period of three months.

The TIB receives requests 52 weeks per year and aims to process all requests within one (1) week. In some cases, the TIB asks the services for additional information if there are any uncertainties. In such cases, the TIB cannot issue a ruling immediately. Once it has received the response, the TIB will issue the ruling as soon as possible. Where necessary, the TIB will add comments to its ruling, for example if there are points for attention relevant to an extension request.

5. The Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) is tasked with ex-durante and ex-post oversight as to whether the services comply with the rules when exercising their powers.

For a number of years now, there has been a sharp increase in the annual number of requests from the AIVD and the MIVD for the use of special investigatory powers as assessed by the TIB. In 2024, the number of rulings of the TIB increased by 31% to a total of 4,445 rulings, which means an increase of more than 1,000 rulings compared to 2023. The year 2023 also saw an increase, of approximately 17%.

Both services were roughly equally responsible for the increase in the number of requests in 2024. This increase seems understandable. The year 2024 was an eventful year from a geopolitical perspective. For example, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East were still raging in 2024. In addition, the services are constantly

monitoring the increasing threat from countries such as China and Russia. Due to its size and economic power, China is actually capable of changing the balance of power in the world. This could pose a threat to economic security and, therefore, to our national security. Russia could also pose a threat to national security because it appears to become increasingly assertive in its foreign policy. Monitoring threats from Russia therefore remains of great importance. In addition, the services again focused a great deal of attention on the topics of criminal subversion, extremism and terrorism, espionage, the Caribbean region, undesirable foreign interference, industrial security, cyber threats, counter-proliferation and military technology, as evidenced by the requests submitted.

The TIB notes that the turbulent situation in the world and in the Netherlands is reflected in the number and nature of the requests submitted to the TIB for assessment.

In 2024, a total of 159 requests were assessed by the TIB as unlawful, which is 3.6% of the total number of requests. This means that the percentage of unlawful conduct rulings in 2024 fell compared to 2023, when this percentage was 4.4%. Both services had fewer cases of unlawful conduct this year. There is no immediate explanation for this. Over the years, it can be seen that the number of unlawful conduct rulings fluctuates, but always remains relatively low in relation to the total number of requests assessed.

This year stands out because a lack of proportionality in the exercise of a power has led to many unlawful conduct rulings. In more than half of the unlawful conduct rulings, the TIB had to rule that the use of a special investigatory power was not or not sufficiently proportionate to the purpose of that use. In a number of cases involving a lack of substantiation of proportionality, this was subsequently remedied in a new and amended request. A lack of specificity of the use of a power and the absence of a necessity for exercising a power also led to unlawful conduct rulings.

Figure 1: total number of requests assessed and number of unlawful conduct rulings



In addition to the regular procedure for submitting a request, the services also have the option of applying the emergency procedure. This procedure can be used in emergency situations where it is not possible to wait for the regular procedure to be completed. In such cases, the Minister (first) gives verbal authorisation for the use of the special investigatory power. The request must then be submitted “immediately” in writing to the Minister and then to the TIB. In such cases, the authorisation granted by the Minister will only be reviewed by the TIB once the powers have already been exercised (for some time). This means that data are actually collected without the TIB first conducting a lawfulness assessment. If the TIB subsequently rules that the authorisation granted by the Minister was not lawful, all results must be destroyed immediately. It is therefore essential

that, following verbal authorisation from the Minister, the request is submitted to the TIB in writing as soon as possible. After all, any potentially unlawful situation should end as quickly as possible.

The CTIVD and the TIB had concerns about the time it took before an emergency request was submitted to the TIB. In July 2024, a joint letter was therefore sent to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. That letter[1] stated, among other things, that in more than half of the cases it took more than 10 days before the AIVD submitted the Minister's verbal authorisation in writing to the Minister, and therefore even longer before the TIB could issue its ruling on the matter. The CTIVD and the TIB jointly urged the AIVD to correctly implement the requirement to submit the verbal authorisation granted by the Minister to the TIB for review in writing 'immediately'.

In 2024, both services jointly submitted a total of 199 emergency requests, representing 4.5% of the total number of requests submitted. In 2023, 193 emergency requests were submitted, representing 5.7%. In 2024, the TIB had to issue more rulings as to the unlawful use of the emergency procedure by the services, namely 14 times in total, compared with 7 times in 2023. In those cases, the period between the moment at which the service became aware of a situation in which the use of a power was necessary and the moment at which such power actually had to be used, was too long.

Generally, the TIB deems the mere finding of unlawfulness to be sufficient if the authorisation granted by the Minister is not submitted to it in time. In the past calendar year, there was one situation in which this was not the case.

The TIB found an unlawful situation (a lack of power) and posed questions to the AIVD, after which the request was withdrawn by the AIVD. After a lengthy period, the AIVD resubmitted the request, applying the emergency procedure. The reasons given for this did not correspond with the circumstances already known to the TIB. In that case, the TIB ruled that the emergency procedure had not been applied lawfully and that the results achieved through the use of the power had to be destroyed.

Figure 2: total number of requests assessed, unlawful conduct rulings and emergency rulings



[1] Letter to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations dated 1 July 2024, 'Onverwijlde spoed ex art. 37 Wiv 2017'.

2. Cable and the Interim Measures Act

In 2024, the TIB received one request for cable interception based on the Interim Measures Act.

'The Interim Measures Act on investigations by the AIVD and the MIVD into countries with offensive cyber programmes, bulk data sets and other specific provisions' (hereinafter referred to as 'the Interim Measures Act') came into effect on 1 July 2024. The powers used by the services to investigate countries with offensive cyber programmes have been significantly expanded by the Interim Measures Act. For a number of special investigatory powers, the prior binding oversight by the TIB has been replaced by binding oversight by the CTIVD during and after the exercise of these powers. It also creates an option for the services to appeal a ruling of the TIB or the CTIVD to the Council of State. No rulings were appealed in 2024.

During this reporting year, the TIB had to deal with both the provisions of the ISS Act 2017 and the provisions of the Interim Measures Act that came into force halfway through the calendar year with regard to powers to intercept large-scale internet traffic passing through the cable.

Since the ISS Act 2017 came into effect, the services have had the power to intercept large-scale internet traffic passing through the cable. Such internet traffic takes place on fibre customer channels that are used to carry internet traffic. This power to intercept the cable consists of two parts: the taking of snapshots and the actual targeted interception of a customer channel on the cable for intelligence purposes, i.e. the actual production.

Cable interception had already been deemed lawful by the TIB in 2023. In 2024, requests for extension of cable interception were also deemed lawful. The actual production of cable interception continued throughout 2024 on the basis of the ISS Act 2017.

The TIB held extensive consultations about the cable with both the CTIVD and the services on several occasions during the year. During these consultations, the services consistently expressed high expectations. Looking at the results to date as shown by the requests, the TIB has had to conclude that these high expectations are not reflected in the results for this reporting year.

In the last quarter of 2023, both services submitted requests for snapshotting types of data that are different from before. These requests were deemed unlawful by the TIB due to problems with the necessity, specificity and subsidiarity of the use of the relevant powers. In May 2024, the TIB received these requests in a new and amended form and assessed them as lawful on the basis of the ISS Act 2017. This means that, from that moment onwards, other types of data have also been intercepted for snapshotting purposes. This authorisation was granted for one year.

In early September 2024, the AIVD and the MIVD submitted the first request for authorisation to the TIB under Section 6 of the Interim Measures Act. This request concerned the exploration of cable-bound international data flows for the purpose of investigation-related interception insofar as these fall within the scope of the Interim Measures Act. These requests were assessed as lawful by the TIB. Since the end of October 2024, there have been explorations for the purpose of investigation-related interception on the basis of the Interim Measures Act. The year 2024 did not yet see any actual production under the Interim Measures Act.

In addition to expanding investigations into countries with offensive cyber programmes, the Interim Measures Act also provides a legal basis for the TIB to assess the lawfulness of the use of the 'stomme tap'[2]. Under the 'stomme tap' review covenant[3], the TIB has, since 1 October 2023, received dozens of requests for assessment regarding the use of this special investigatory power of the services. Since 1 July 2024, the TIB has received requests submitted under the Interim Measures Act.

The CTIVD and the TIB also held joint consultations on the application of a form of automated data analysis (ADA), namely a neural network. This was prompted by a request for a search aimed at selecting data from investigation-related interception that was submitted by the AIVD to the TIB in the autumn of 2024. This request mentioned the use of the neural network. The TIB did not agree with the AIVD's position that the basis for the use of the neural network could be found in the general investigatory power to use ADA (Section 60 of the ISS Act 2017). The TIB ruled that in this specific case – the use of ADA involving cable data – the legislature required that Section 50(1)(b) of the ISS Act 2017 be used as the legal basis for this. This also meant that the authorisation for the use of the neural network should have been submitted to the TIB, which was not the case. In view of this, the TIB issued an unlawful conduct ruling.

> "The year 2024 did not yet see any actual production of cable interception under the Interim Measures Act."

[2] The *real-time* collection of data on users of a telecommunications service and their communication traffic.

[3] Government Gazette of the Kingdom of the Netherlands: 2023,26548 'Convenant toetsing stomme tap'.

3. Criminal subversion

During this calendar year, the TIB repeatedly expressed its concerns to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Director-General of the AIVD about the fine line between the areas of national security and criminal investigations in operations targeting criminal organizations.

The AIVD investigates threats to national security posed by criminal organizations. In this context, the AIVD focuses on many targets and non-targets[4] within various criminal networks.

In 2024, the TIB assessed a considerable number of requests relating to such operations. These requests concerned both new operations and extension requests. The TIB assessed several requests as unlawful. The majority of the requests were assessed as lawful.

If the AIVD wishes to use a special investigatory power against a target within an organised criminal group, it must provide sufficient grounds to show that there are serious grounds for believing that the target poses a threat to national security. The TIB is of the opinion that the mere mention of present or former criminal activities is not sufficient for this purpose. Activities or objectives pursued by the target that pose a threat to national security must therefore always be specifically substantiated, and the reasons for this must also be clearly stated.

As these investigations focus on criminal organizations, it is conceivable that the AIVD and the police may investigate the same individuals in some operations. In such cases, both an intelligence investigation and a criminal investigation will be conducted. When a criminal investigation runs parallel to an intelligence investigation, it is not always immediately clear whether the use of a special investigatory power by the AIVD meets the requirements of necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity. After all, the AIVD can also obtain the information acquired by the police through the use of general investigatory powers.

When investigatory powers are used against non-targets, sufficient justification must be provided that the non-target can provide insight into targets or criminal organizations. The infringement of the privacy of a non-target who is not under investigation and will not, in principle, become the subject of an investigation carries additional weight in this regard.

[4] A non-target is a person or organisation close to the target against whom or which a special investigatory power is used in order to gain insight into the target through this person or organisation.

In this annual report, the TIB expresses its concern about the fact that investigations into criminal organizations are expanding. The TIB emphasises that the use of special investigatory powers must continue to be limited to persons or organisations whose objectives or activities give rise to serious suspicion that they pose a threat to national security.

The AIVD also wants to gain insight into infiltration and corruption within government bodies or companies for the benefit of criminal interests and activities that give rise to serious suspicion that there is a threat to national security. It is not a requirement that the person themselves poses a threat to national security or is part of an organised criminal group. However, in the opinion of the TIB, the link between the activities that a person carries or carried out and the threat to national security posed by those activities must be sufficiently substantiated.

> “The TIB is concerned about the fact that investigations into criminal organizations are expanding.”

Another concern of the TIB relates to the handling of communications from professionals bound by privilege. After all, persons within criminal organizations often receive legal assistance. This means that these individuals communicate with lawyers or other professionals bound by privilege more often than other targets. Such communication may not be included in the intelligence investigation without the explicit permission of the Hague District Court. In the opinion of the TIB, this requires a continuous assessment of whether or not communications are privileged

In December 2024, the CTIVD and the TIB sent a letter on the ‘scope of national security’ to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, expressing their concerns that investigations into criminal organizations could entail a risk between the areas of national security and criminal investigations.

4. Extremism and terrorism

In 2024, the TIB received requests for assessment regarding the use of special investigatory powers against extremists and terrorists. These requests concerned various groups, such as jihadists, radical Islamic movements, right-wing extremists, anti-institutionalists and left-wing extremists.

During its review, the TIB assessed each request to determine whether there was an actual threat to national security. The mere fact that a person or group disagrees with government policy does not constitute sufficient grounds for the use of special investigatory powers. Nor is the fact that someone adheres to and/or propagates certain ideas sufficient to justify the use of a special investigatory power.

The threat to national security posed by certain extremist and terrorist groups is identified, assessed and mitigated where possible through the use of special investigatory powers by the services. In order to prevent or monitor any (new) threats in the Netherlands, a close eye is kept on various groups in the Netherlands and abroad. Where there is serious suspicion that extremism and terrorism by individuals or organisations pose a threat, the TIB assesses the use of special investigatory powers as lawful.

These are, for example, pro-ISIS jihadists who intend to travel abroad and join ISIS, as well as convicted jihadists. In addition to targeting these jihadists, efforts are also focused on radical Islamic movements in the Netherlands that pose a threat to the democratic legal order. This also includes various terrorist organisations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, which have supporters worldwide

> “The mere fact that a person or group disagrees with government policy does not constitute sufficient grounds for the use of special investigatory powers.”

The TIB also assessed the use of special investigatory powers against certain right-wing extremist individuals and groups in the Netherlands as lawful. Supporters of this movement draw their inspiration from accelerationism, an ideology that sees terrorist attacks as a means of accelerating racial war. They often work together and international groups also frequently seek each other out. They often communicate online. In general, these groups are anti-semitic and racist, and often display misogyny and hatred towards LGBT people.

Anti-institutionalists are another group for which the use of special investigatory powers has been deemed lawful. The common worldview is that in the Netherlands (and worldwide) there is a malicious elite actively seeking world control. For some, the goal seems to be to withdraw from Dutch society and live in their own parallel society. This group also includes the self-proclaimed 'sovereigns'. Based on various conspiracy theories, they believe that the government has no legitimate power and that laws and rules therefore do not apply to them unless they themselves agree to them. In some cases, the threshold for using violence against state representatives is approved or even encouraged. Within the anti-institutional movement, there is a separate subgroup that urges its followers to take matters into their own hands and replace the Dutch legal system.

> "Where there is serious suspicion that extremism and terrorism pose a threat, the TIB assesses the use of special investigatory powers as lawful."

The group of left-wing extremists for which the TIB has deemed the use of special investigatory powers to be lawful is centred around an anarchist worldview. They often draw on themes that are on many people's minds. They see the rise of the right wing as a problem, but do not necessarily use violence to achieve their goals. In their view, the existing political and economic system is flawed and must be fought against.

5. About the TIB

The Investigatory Powers Commission (TIB) consists of three permanent members, two of whom, including the chairperson, have extensive experience in the judiciary. The third member was appointed for his technical expertise. In 2024, the TIB consisted of Ms A.M. (Anne Mieke) Zwaneveld, LL.M., chairperson, Mr E.H.M. (Eric) Druijf, LL.M., and Mr O.A. (Otto) Vermeulen. The TIB also has deputy members: Mr S.M. (Simon) van der Schenk, LL.M., and Mr. J. (Jurjen) Piena, LL.M., who can be called upon when the permanent members are unavailable. In 2024, Prof. E.R. (Eric) Verheul started as a deputy member of the TIB. This means that the TIB now has a full complement of members and deputy members. The commission is supported by a staff consisting of secretary-director Mr L.W. (Lennart) Schroijen, LL.M., deputy secretary-director Mr S.V. (Sander) de Vries, LL.M., legal and technical advisors who prepare the decisions and advise the commission, an information advisor and a management assistant. In 2024, the TIB consisted of 12.10 FTEs. At the end of the year, the actual number of staff was 13. This can be explained by the fact that some staff members work part-time.

The TIB has had a low absenteeism rate for many years. The national average absenteeism rate has been around 5% for several years, while the TIB's rate is lower. In 2024, the TIB saw no cases of long-term absences due to illness.

The TIB's office is located at Nieuwe Uitleg 1 in The Hague. This was preceded by a number of developments.

On 16 August 2024, most of the Ministry of General Affairs – the TIB's "landlord" – moved from the Binnenhof to the temporary accommodation at Turfmarkt 147 in The Hague. This location is not suitable for the TIB due to the state secret nature of its work. Within a very short period, the TIB found temporary accommodation in the National Police building at Nieuwe Uitleg 1 in The Hague. In three weeks' time, an independent state secret office accessible only to the TIB was created with the help of a number of construction companies, the police organisation, specialist knowledge from the Ministry of General Affairs, and the persons responsible within the AIVD and MIVD for establishing connections.

The TIB is very grateful to the National Police force and its staff for their assistance and hospitality.

The Ministry of General Affairs will relocate to Bezuidenhoutseweg 73 in The Hague in the course of 2025. The TIB will also relocate to Bezuidenhoutseweg, to a suitable location within that building.

This chapter concludes with a look at the finances. The Ministry of General Affairs allocated a budget of €2,013 million to the TIB for 2024. The TIB has no policy-directed funds and the vast majority of its budget, over 85%, is spent on salaries. The remainder of the budget goes to accommodation costs, IT services and general office expenses.

Due to the 30% increase in the number of requests to be assessed, it is urgently necessary to expand the TIB's workforce and staffing levels. In 2024, there was no such expansion. The TIB has held discussions with the Ministry of General Affairs about the desired expansion of the workforce and, consequently, an increase in the budget. The TIB will be able to hire new staff members in 2025.

From left to right: Mr L.W. (Lennart) Schroijen, LL.M., Mr S.V. (Sander) de Vries, LL.M., Ms A.M. (Anne Mieke) Zwaneveld, LL.M., Mr E.H.M. (Eric) Druijf, LL.M., and Mr O.A. (Otto) Vermeulen.

6. Relationship with the CTIVD and revision of the ISS Act

In 2024, frequent consultations took place between the CTIVD and the TIB on a number of topics. These topics included the “use of the emergency procedure” and “scope of national security” and the IMSI catcher[5]. Three joint letters were sent to the Minister on these topics.

In the coming years, there will be a number of changes, both for the TIB itself and in terms of its cooperation with the CTIVD.

Preparations for the announced revision of the ISS Act 2017 have already been set in motion. In the political and social debate on the revision of the ISS Act 2017, the interests of security on the one hand and fundamental rights, such as the privacy of citizens, on the other, play a major role. At a time when many major social and political developments are taking place simultaneously around the world and in the Netherlands, it is important to enshrine a robust system of checks and balances in law. In the coming period, the TIB will continue to emphasise the importance of striking the right balance, the degree of infringement of fundamental rights being given an appropriate level of protection. This is not a contradiction; both elements have their place in the new ISS Act for the protection of our democracy under the rule of law.

The TIB and CTIVD consider it very important that the revision of the ISS Act 2017 opts for the introduction of a single oversight body. The TIB and the CTIVD have previously indicated their preference for introducing a single oversight body that carries out end-to-end oversight. At the time, the provisional name chosen was the ‘National Security Authority’ (Autoriteit Nationale Veiligheid). An integrated oversight body, located in suitable accommodation, is still the preferred option. As far as the TIB is concerned, the creation of a single oversight body for the activities of the AIVD and the MIVD is the only way forward.

> “As far as the TIB is concerned, the creation of a single oversight body is the way forward.”

The advantages for the services and society are obvious. Concentrating review and supervision as much as possible within a single body will promote legal uniformity and, consequently, legal certainty and equality. This cooperation will make it possible to effectively align the ex-ante review and ex-post oversight and

[5] Letter to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations dated 28 November 2024, ‘Rechtseenheid – wettelijke grondslag voor het gebruik van de IMSI-catcher’.

establish a normative framework for the whole chain, thereby ensuring that the safeguard function of review and oversight is fulfilled in a future-proof manner. This also complies with the requirements imposed by the European Court of Human Rights regarding effective oversight of the use of infringing investigatory powers by the security services. Public and political control of the services, and thus public confidence in the functioning of the services within the legal framework and legitimacy of their work, is also safeguarded in this way.

7. Outlook

Technological developments such as quantum and AI, current cyber threats and increasing international tensions and threats also have consequences for the work of the TIB. The coming period looks set to be turbulent, given the ongoing military conflicts and geopolitical tensions in various parts of the world. Terrorism, extremism, cyber threats, espionage, criminal subversion and influence will continue to pose a threat to our national security in 2025 and beyond. This includes threats to security interests and the undermining of the international order, as well as economic security issues. There also appears to be an increase in espionage and sabotage activities, disinformation, covert influence and military intimidation. The same applies to cyber attacks by countries with offensive cyber programmes targeting governments, companies and organisations.

The TIB expects that the scope of the use of special investigatory powers to be assessed will increase even further in the coming years. The increase in the budget for the AIVD and the MIVD will certainly play a role in this. The TIB will therefore increase its staff in 2025 so that it can continue to assess the lawfulness of such use in a timely manner. In addition, extra efforts will be made to further develop and safeguard technological knowledge within the TIB.

The TIB intends to continue exchanging information with the services in 2025 and to organise meetings on specific topics, such as the Interim Measures Act, technological developments and cyber security, where necessary and appropriate.

In 2025, the TIB will continue to monitor the balance between the protection and infringement of fundamental rights, thereby contributing to our democracy under the rule of law.

> “The TIB will expand in 2025 as a result of the increase in the number of requests.”

Toetsingscommissie
Inzet Bevoegdheden